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Old elites can block changes, but not all do. Why is it that stronger
elites may allow more changes than weaker elites? Why do economies
with larger stocks of natural resources not grow faster than economies
poorer in natural resources?
We argue that old elites hold some power to extract rents from the
economy. Whereas old sectors (i.e. agriculture or extraction of natural
resources) are not aﬀected by rent extraction, modern sectors require
investments that do react to rent extraction. At the same time, a
modern sector relies on networks of ﬁrms. These structures form the
basis of political power of a new elite, which reduces the ability of the
old elite to extract rents.
We show that countries rich in natural resources provide their old
elite with incentives to extract rents so high that the private sector
has no incentives to build up a modern economy. If the old elite is
either politically very strong or the natural resource sector is small
compared to the potential of the modern sector, the old elite will
choose to extract smaller rents from a growing sector. Some empirical
evidence completes the paper.
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11 Introduction
Some incumbent and usually unproductive elites, consisting of the top of
the state bureaucracy together with an aristocracy and a monarch (if these
were present), have heavily discouraged the emergence of a modern sector by
means of punitive taxation. Well known examples include the experiences of
19th century Austria, Uzbekistan and Ethiopia in the 1990’s, and Zimbabwe
i nt h el a s tf e wy e a r s .O t h e re l i t e sb a c kr e f o r m st h a tr e d u c et a x e so nm o d e r n
sectors. Well-studied examples include 19th century England, Poland in the
1990’s and Kazakhstan just last year. Why this divergence?
The general answer on which economists, political scientists, and sociol-
ogists agree is that some elites fear a loss of power over the division of tax
receipts by the development of a modern economy. This is coupled with the
impossibility of the modern sector to buy out the old elite by oﬀering future
tax revenues.1 On this impossibility of a buyout, Acemoglu (2002) remarks
that ‘there is no outside agency with the coercive capacity to enforce such
arrangements’. Even if such coercive agencies were available, there would
still be a missing markets problem in the sense that one would want to bind
future ﬁrms and future generations to previously agreed upon transfers.
O nt h eq u e s t i o no fw h a ti ti sa b o u tam o d e r ns e c t o r ,w h i c hm i n i m a l l y
includes modern industry and services, that makes old elites fear them, opin-
ions diverge. One explanation has been that old elites fear the technology
of a modern sector. One version, termed the ‘economic-losers hypothesis’ by
A c e m o g l ua n dR o b i n s o n( 2 0 0 0 a ) ,i st h a ti n c u m b e n t sp r e v e n tt h ea d o p t i o no f
new technology by others in order to prevent erosion of their sunk technolog-
ical capital. Such ‘machine-rage’ is however seldom successful and thereby
of scant empirical relevance. The historical attempts of old technology hold-
ers to prevent the adoption of new technologies such as book-printing, guns,
1Economic works include Krueger (1993), Acemoglu (2003), Acemoglu and Robinson
(2000a, 2000b, 2000c, 20002), Krusell and Rios-Rull (1996), Parente and Prescot (1994,
1999, 2000), Hahn (2003). North (1990) and Guy (2000) survey the literature including
references to non-economists.
2mechanized transport, mechanized sewing-machines, and the internet have
been spectacularly unsuccessful.
Another version is that technological growth is the driving force behind
the growing relative economic might of industrialists which in turn leads old
elites to block technological growth as a means of preserving power. The key
relevant assumptions employed by Acemoglu and Robinson (2000, 2002) are
that the modern sector grows exclusively via technology and that its growth
increases the odds that an old elite loses power.
This hypothesis too is implausible though: even the most dictatorial
regime is nowadays ‘on-line’ and employs the latest technology to extract
rents and subdue opposition. Technology beneﬁts ‘old-sectors’ sometimes
even more than the new sectors. For instance, even in dirt-poor areas dev-
astated by rent-seeking inspired wars, such as the Congo at present, mineral
extraction uses the best technology available. It is hence more the case that
the modern sector in many developing countries is kept very small due to
rent-extraction rather than that technology per se is resisted. Indeed, the
history of white-elephants in Africa, i.e. technological prestige projects that
never made productive sense, suggests that dictatorial regimes are often keen
to embrace modern technology themselves.
W ea r g u et h a ti ti sn o tt e c h n o l o g yt h a ti sf e a r e db yt h eo l de l i t e ,b u tr a t h e r
the rise of networks of business relations that typify modern sector growth.
In a micro-model we detail the productive importance of networks in the
sense that comparative advantages can be better utilised in larger networks.
These networks and the institutions that result from the investment in such
networks also form an alternative political network that is an opposing power
to that of the old elite. In our model, the power of the new politicians
connected to the modern sector network sets an upper limit on the possible
extraction of rents by the old elite. Individual ﬁrms are small enough not
to beneﬁt individually from this political eﬀect. Hence, when the old elite
allows the modern sector to grow it has to weight its loss of political power
against the growing productivity of the economy. The old elite will be able
3to extract a smaller share from a growing pie. Crucial in determining what
happens is then not only the initial strength of the old elite, but also the size
of the pie in the absence of any modern sector, i.e. the size of the traditional
or natural resources exploitation sector. The higher this ‘ﬁxed-pie’, the more
an old elite has to lose by a growing modern sector and hence the higher
the disincentives provided by the old elite for the modern sector. The loss
in political power that goes hand in hand with the growing modern sector
(and the bigger pie) adds to the “tax-base” eﬀect identiﬁed by McGuire
and Olson (1996). Where McGuire and Olson only observe that lower rent
extraction rates lead to higher modern sector investments and thus those in
power will not extract all rents, we argue that they may still do so, if the
political base is eroded due to the growth of the modern sector. Especially
the existence of a traditional sector which does not have a political base
increases the incentives of the old elite to supress a modern sector. As Olson
(1996) observes in economies based upon such traditional sectors, a lack of
coordination among agents exists. But coordination is necessary to set up
institutions fostering growth and restricting rent extraction by the old elite.
A n o t h e rp o i n tw h e r ew ed i ﬀer from previous analyses is that we think it
a mistake to view power as all-or-nothing, which is the assumption employed
i na l lp r e v i o u sf o r m a lm o d e l sw ek n o w . T h el o s so fp o w e ro ft h eo l de l i t e
is seldom discrete but continuous. It may be pointed out that even today
there is a British, German, and Austrian aristocracy that enjoys considerable
rents. Neither is the aristocracy the only remnant of ‘old power’. The biggest
landowners in Britain today are the aristocracy, the crown, and the Church of
England. Churches in Germany are still ﬁnanced via the federal tax system,
more than a century after the key reforms that allowed industrialization to
take place. Hence in our model, old elites fear the loss of some degree of
power, but not the total loss of their power.
Our model helps to explain why in recent cases of countries breaking up,
the smaller resource-rich parts actually suppressed the modern sector to a
greater extent than other parts did, for instance Uzbekistan after the break
4u po ft h eU S S R .T h i sc o u l dn o th a v ea r i s e ni nm o d e l sw h e r et h eo l de l i t ei n
the previously existing country has already ‘lost entirely’ to a modern sector
or where these old sectors where of less importance. Our model furthermore
m a k e si tp o s s i b l et od e ﬁne what the ‘feared’ modern sector is and what the
old sector is: the modern sector is any sector that needs new and large
networks to ﬂourish. Sectors that ﬂourish without networks are not a threat
and are thus expected to be a welcome source of rent extraction for any
old elite. This ﬁts the observation that technologically advanced mineral
extraction companies are welcomed in many dictatorships whilst modern
service industries are not. We provide some evidence for our theory with
respect to the former USSR countries in section ﬁve.
In the next Section we discuss the literature, after which we present our
main model and results. Section four gives micro foundations for the im-
portance of networks for a modern sector. Section ﬁve discusses empirical
evidence for our theory, drawing particularly on the diﬀerences experienced
by Brazil and the US. The ﬁnal Section concludes.
2L i t e r a t u r e
Anne O. Krueger (1993) dedicated her Ohlin Lectures to reforms in devel-
oping countries. She discussed informally various forces that determine how
politicians deal with “Market reactions to politicians’ decisions [that] inﬂu-
ence both individual politicians and their further decisions and also change
the nature of the political balance among competing political groups”.
Acemoglu and Robinson (2000, 2002) and Acemoglu (2003) provide spe-
ciﬁc models on this question. In Acemoglu and Robinson (2002), an incum-
bent government has to decide whether to allow a growth enhancing reform
or not. Introducing the reform will change the distribution of power in the
economy and the costs to replace a government. The government will be
replaced if the public expect more beneﬁts from a new government than it
suﬀers from the costs of ﬁnancing the change in government. The authors
5show that the old elite may block reforms because technological and insti-
tutional reforms will increase the probability that the incumbent loses his
position.
Krusell and Rios-Rull (1996) argue that vested interests of some agents
prevent the adoption of a new technology. In their model, these agents are
market incumbents who want to block competition by new, modern ﬁrms
with a better technology.
Acemoglu and Robinson in another set or papers (2000b, 2000c, 2001)
address the question of democratization and redistribution in a two (three)
class society. (Full) Democratization will lead to the poorest class determin-
ing redistribution. These articles contain two arguments. First, they argue
that democratization can be seen as a policy to appease the lower class by
guaranteeing redistribution not only in the current period with a strong lower
class (2000b,c) but also in the future, thus avoiding social unrest and larger
demands (socialization of private property). Partial democratization, shift-
ing power to a middle class, is dominated because it is a sign of weakness of
the old elite (2000b) even though it would mean less redistribution and thus
less contributions that have to be made by the old elite. Second, they study
the stability of a political system, namely they allow the poor to start a rev-
olution and the rich to stage a coup (2001). A system is consolidated if the
costs of a revolution to the poor or the costs of a coup to rich are too large.
The ruling class will use redistribution policies to avoid a system change if
possible. Redistribution is aﬀected by measures of democratic freedom - the
costs of staging a coup and starting a revolution. A very democratic and
equal society (coups are expensive, revolutions cheap) has the highest rates
of redistribution. A very undemocratic system (coups are cheap and revolu-
tions expensive) has the lowest rates of redistribution. When coups become
cheaper with greater inequality, then greater ex ante inequality force the poor
to refrain from too much redistribution and thus avoid a coup. Under this
constellation, higher inequality leads to lower redistribution. In the case that
the costs of revolution and coups are large but not too large, Acemoglu and
6Robinson observe that the system will continuously switch between the two
systems. One aspect of this theory of political transition is that higher in-
equality in a society always implies a higher volatility of ﬁscal (redistributive)
expenditure and may, in some cases, change the status of the system.
Parente and Prescott (1994, 1999, 2000) show empirically that barriers
to technological reforms aﬀect economic growth. In the 2000 Walras Lec-
ture they explicitly argue a certain form of rent extraction, namely that the
government (the king) extracts rents by granting monopoly rights to certain
producers and that these rights lead to less competition and an ineﬃcient use
of available technology and hence hampers the growth potential of an econ-
omy. Countries diﬀer in how much governments made use of this instrument
to generate income.
Hahn (2003) argues that an old elite is not always observed by others,
but nevertheless it has the power of sabotage, i.e. it can stop any reform. An
old elite will then stop any reform as long as there is any rent remaining in
the present situation. Because reformers cannot commit to future transfers
to the (unobserved) old elite, reforms will then only take place after all rents
are exhausted.
Conley and Temimi (2001) put forward another explanation for endoge-
nous enfranchisement decisions. Similar to the present approach, the non-
ruling class has some power. Instead of a continuous participation as in our
model, in their model the dominated class can inﬂict a punishment on the
r u l i n gc l a s sa tac o s t . I ft h ec o n ﬂicts of interest are not too large between
the groups, (full) enfranchisement is the less costly option to avoid such a
punishment by the ruling class. In our model a smaller traditional sector
brings the interests of the modern sector closer to those of the old elite.
73 A Model of Political Power, Rent Extrac-
tion and a Modern Sector
The economy consists of two sectors. The old sector is completely indepen-
dent of contact creation. We think here mainly about the extraction and sale
of natural resources to the world market. This includes cash-crop agriculture,
which can be understood as the sale of exploitation of the ﬁxed resource land.
The modern sector needs a network of business relation (relational capital2)
to function and prosper. The essential role of these networks is to allow ﬁrms
and individuals to specialize in their comparative advantage and to outsource
all other activities. In the old sector 0 we assume that the income generated
is ﬁxed at ¯ y.
Sector 1, the modern sector, is populated by an inﬁnite number of ﬁrms
with mass 1. The output of a representative ﬁrm is f(RCt)=RC α
t where
RCt is the size of the network of contacts of an individual ﬁrm at time t.3 This
production function is kept simple for presentational purposes, but we will
discuss the necessary assumptions on a general production function later.4
Firms face diminishing returns to scale, i.e. 0 <α<1 . RC is productive for
one period only but it determines the political power of the modern sector
in the next period. RC can be generated (or maintained) at marginal cost c.
One can see this as the labor costs of building a network with a ﬁxed wage
rate (constant outside option). This means that from the point of each ﬁrm,
each period’s decision on RC has no forward-looking aspect to it and thus
derives from one-period proﬁt maximization motives. In section 5 we will
2Bezemer et al. (2003) and Frijters et al. (2003) introduce this concept in a dynamic
growth model where the focus is on the inner workings of the modern sector with respect
to contact formation, contact destruction, and technological growth. The present paper
can be seen as detailing the potential political importance of this concept.
3The reason why we denote the single input as RC is that we want to emphasize our
view that modern sector’s power increases due to the business network of the modern
sector. One could also use any arbitrary input (labor, capital) to measure the size of the
modern economy and claim that this goes along with the build-up of political power.
4Another simple example which yields the same result is f(RCt)=l nRCt.
8also provide some microfoundations how contacts matter for production.
The political sector contains two types of politicians. The ﬁrst type de-
cides purely in the interest of the old elite. These are agents paid by the
old elite or powers-that-be such as existing monarchs and existing political
elites. Of the second type are representatives of the modern sector. We take
the political network of the ﬁrst group to be ﬁxed and equal to PP0 which
hence indicates the power contained by the political network of existing non-
modern sector elites. We refer to this group as the ‘old elite’. The political
network of the second group is directly proportional to the average size of the
networks of the modern sector denoted as RCt, i.e. equals PPm = M0+RCt.
This points to the dual role of relational capital, i.e. its direct productive
role in securing sold output and its role as a network leading to political
power. One may interpret the manager involved in maintaining a relation-
ship between one ﬁrm to another as a member of the modern elite whereas
M0 represents the owners of modern sector ﬁrms that are inborn members of
the modern elite. M0 represents the exogenous political power of the modern
sector, it may also represent support by some (avant-garde) members of the
old elite.
To derive an additive notion of power we assume that PP 0 presents the
number of politicians of the old elite and PP m as the number of the new elite.
(An equivalent interpretation is to view them not as numbers of politicians
but as some aggregate support such as campaign funds or the number of vot-
ers that can be swayed). Suppose that the country consists of a large number
of regions of the same size. In each region the party that employs most politi-
cians in this region wins the local elections and controls the decisions of that
region. Elections take place sequentially and only the politicians send by the
winning party are ‘absorbed’ (they take oﬃce), by that region whereas losing
politicians can be moved to other regions, similar to the payment function
in a sequential ﬁrst price multiple unit auction.
T h e r ea r em a n ye q u i l i b r i ai nt h i sg a m eb u tf o ra l lo ft h e mt h eo l de l i t e
9will control a share of
PP0
PP0+M0+RCt−1 of all regions.5 The share controlled by
t h en e we l i t ei se q u a lt o( 1 −
PP0
PP0+M0+RCt−1).
The ruling politicians decide on the rent extraction rate from the econ-
omy. As far as they decide on taxes funding public goods beneﬁcial for all,
incentives of all politicians will overlap and there will be no disagreements.
We hence leave them out of consideration and focus on taxes that have no
direct beneﬁt. There is only one tax in our framework, namely a tax on
produced output accruing to the old elite (we thus take taxes to be net of
ﬂows to the holders of RC). In each period, the current set of politicians bar-
gain over taxes. For the politicians of the modern sector, it is the case that
their preferred tax rate is going to be τt =0in all periods, simply because
these taxes are distortionary and the revenue that is raised by them has to
be shared with individuals not from within that sector. The full weight of
the ‘new elite’ will hence be towards τt =0 . On the other had, the ‘old elite’
will always want positive taxes on the modern sector. As their maximum
position, they could wish τt =1 .
Firms are active in all regions and have to choose their investment for
t h ew h o l ec o u n t r y .T h e yw i l lh e n c et a k et h ea v e r a g er e n te x t r a c t i o nr a t ea s
the one determining investment. The maximum amount of tax an old elite
5To see this, in equilibrium, the “modern elite” can always choose the number of
politicians sent by the old elite +ε to the ﬁrst regions where the old elite sends the
average or less. After the ﬁrst 1 − PP 0
PP 0+M0+RCt−1 share of regions they will be out of
politicians (assuming the old elite sends the average to all regions), such that the rest
(share PP 0
PP 0+M0+RCt−1) of the regions goes to the old elite. The best the old elite can do
is distribute their politicians equally over all regions.
10could extract from each ﬁrm equals the proportion of regions they control.6
In relation to McGuire’s and Olson’s (1996) model of rent extraction
three comments may be illustrative. First, in the language of McGuire and
Olson, our old elite is an (unproductive) autocracy. Second, in contrast to
their approach our autocrats have to share power with the modern sector
politicians. Third, we abstractcompletely from the public good game but
concentrate on the Leviathan aspect we have in common with McGuire and
Olson’s contribution.
To summarize, we assume an additive notion of power, where the weight
of the old elite in political decision making is
PP0
PP0+M0+RCt−1. Given that the
new elite always choose τt =0 , the ‘old elite’ at each moment in time can
choose a tax rate τt that is constrained by the maximum (expected) tax rate
τt =
PP0
PP0+M0+RCt−1 it can push through given the political constellation .
Remark 1 A feasible outcome of this economy is thus any set {τ0,..,τT}o f





where RCt−1 is endoge-
nous.
Note, our political set-up is a long cry from most political economy models
that assume that power ultimately is equally divided over individuals via the
one-man-one-vote assumption. We explicitly allow the old elite to have more
power than the politicians from the modern elite. For developing countries
the one-man-one-vote assumption is very problematic. Even in countries that
are notionally democratic, elected politicians are not the only ones that make
decisions. Demands from the military, industry, agricultural lobbies, unions,
6Another micro foundation for our notion of political power is the following. Elections
take place in each period after investment decisions but politician beforehand commit to a
policy τ. There exists an unknown pivotal issue that voters care about. The ﬁrst politician
to ‘hit’ this issue wins the election. We assume each politician has the same probability
to hit the issue, i.e. the number of hits over time is linear in the number of politicians.
That is in expectation, PP 0
PP 0+M0+RCt−1 of times the policy will be chosen by politicians
from the old elite. Firms in this story invest, given the expected extraction rate that will
result from elections.
11lower-level bureaucracies, etc., can often not be ignored by elected politicians.
Very often, interest groups directly control certain (semi-) state organs and
hence by-pass elected politicians completely. Rather than adopting the one-
man-one-vote assumption in a set-up where a single unit decides all (i.e.
a national administration), we take the dynamics of power in the whole
economy as the central problem. It is then much more natural to conceive of
power as a continuous concept.
The timing is as follows. There is an inﬁnite number of discrete periods.
At period 0 the modern sector is non existent, i.e., RC0 =0 .T h e m o d e r n
sector starts with period 1. Each period consists of two stages. First the old
elite chooses a τt ≤ τt as described above. Then ﬁrms choose independently
from each other a RCt(τt) and produce y(RCt). Taxes are paid and the rest is
consumed. Each individual in this economy uses exponential discounting at
rate ρ. The per-period pay-oﬀ of each individual entrepreneur in the modern
sector period is now
π
M
t =( 1− τt)f(RCt) − RCtc.








Both agents maximize the discounted stream of per-period payoﬀs. Given
the assumption that ﬁrms are small, such that modern sector ﬁrms do not
take into account the political inﬂuence they gain by setting up ﬁrm networks,
their optimal behavior is determined by maximizing the return to RCt in each
period. Due to the setup, only the old elite faces a dynamic problem. Given
that τt is the only state variable, we in principle have to determine a dynamic
equilibrium. We ﬁrst circumvent inter-temporal trade-oﬀsb yl o o k i n ga tt h e
case where the elite has a zero discount rate, and later allow for positive
discount rates. With zero discount rates, the elite’s maximization problem
reduces to ﬁnding the per-period proﬁt maximizing tax that is sustainable.
The within-period trade-oﬀ that the old elite then faces is simple: if it
decides to tax the modern sector by a large amount, the modern sector will
12not develop and there will be less to tax. If it does not tax the modern sector
heavily, the modern sector will grow fast yielding more tax revenues, but it
will mean that the tax revenue from the old sector is lower. Intuitively, if
¯ y is very high (or f(.) n o tv e r yh i g h ) ,w ew o u l de x p e c tt h e‘ o l de l i t e ’t ob e
relatively little interested in allowing a modern sector to grow and we should
see punitive taxes on the modern sector.
4 Choices and Constraints of the Old Elite
In each period, ﬁrms choose RCt without taking into account the externality
of their behavior on τt+1. The optimal level of RCt of the individual ﬁrm







Given this reaction function, the old elite can predict not only the invest-
ments of the new sector but also its relative political power at the end of the
period. Consider the steady state of the model. In the steady state, the old
elite will maximize its period payoﬀ under the political restriction:
maxτ(y + f(RC(τ)) s.t. τ ≤ τt =
PP 0
PP0 + M0 + RC(τ)
.
We ﬁrst need the following lemma.
Lemma 1 τt(RC(τ)) has at least one and at most three intersections with
τ.
Proof. At least one intersection exists because τt(RC(τ)) is continuous in
τ, τt(RC(τ =0 ) )> 0 and τt(RC(τ =1 ) )< 1. At most three intersections
exist when τt(RC(τ)) h a sa tm o s to n ei n ﬂection point for 0 <τ<1.T h i s
is the case when
d2τt(RC(τ))
d2τ =0has either no or one solution. The necessary
condition is equivalent to
(2−α)RC(τ=0)
(PP+M)α = 1
(1−τ)1/(1−α). The left hand side of
this equation is a positive constant whereas the right hand side is a strictly
13increasing function in τ. Hence there is either one or no solution.
Because of continuity, the generic outcome is having either 1 or 3 such
‘ﬁxed points’.7 I ft h e r ea r et h r e es u c h‘ ﬁxed points’, we refer to: τmin =
min{τ




, τmax =m a x {τ






potential third point fulﬁlling τ =
PP0
PP 0+M0+RC(τ). τmin represents a lower
limit of a tax rate that the old elite can always push through, given that
RC is limited from above. τmax is the maximum tax rate the old elite can
push through given the guaranteed power M0 of the modern sector. If there
is only one ﬁx e dp o i n t ,w ed e n o t ei tb yτmin if τt(RC(τ)) is convex at this
point and as τmax if τt(RC(τ)) is concave.
To state our result, we denote by τold =a r gm a xτ(y+f(RC(τ)),t h et a x
rate the old elite would choose in the absence of modern sector politicians.
It should be immediate that, in all cases the only candidates for a long-
t e r mo u t c o m ei st h es e t{ τold,τmin,τmax,τ0}. Figure 1 provides an example
with three intersections. τold is in this example between τmin and τ0 at the
maximum of the proﬁtc u r v e .F i g u r e2p r o v i d e st w oe x a m p l e sf o rt h ec a s eo f
only one intersection. In case 1, we refer to the intersection as τmax
1 ,i nc a s e
2a sτmin
2 . The following proposition states the result.
Proposition 1 (Steady State Extraction Rates)
If τt(RC(τ)) has only one ﬁxed-point τfp then the steady state rent extraction
rate of the economy is given as τ∗ =m i n {τfp,τold}.
If τt(RC(τ)) has three ﬁxed points {τmin;τ0;τmax}t h e n
τ∗ =
⎧
⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎨
⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎩
(i) τold if τold ≤ τmin
(ii) τmin if τmin <τ old <τ 0 and τ0(y + f(RC(τ0)) ≤ τmin(y + f(RC(τmin))
(iii) τ0 if τmin <τ old <τ 0 and τ0(y + f(RC(τ0)) >τ min(y + f(RC(τmin))
(iv) τold if τ0 <τ old <τ max
(v) τmax if τold ≥ τmax.
7The term generic here means that if we would see M and/or PP0 as drawn from a
continuous probability distribution, having precisely 2 intersections has zero probability
of occurence.
14Proof. Having established the characteristics of τt(RC(τ)) we refer to ﬁgure
1 to make our argument. The old elite in the steady state chooses any τ
that fulﬁlls two conditions, namely: τt ≤ τt(RC(τt−1)) and τt(RC(τt−1)) =
τt+1(RC(τt)). Hence, the set the old elite can choose from the set where
τt(RC(τ)) >τ.
For the case of one ﬁxed-point, this implies that either the old elite can
choose - depending on the parameters - from the set [0;τmax] or from the
set [0;τmin]. The latter poses a stricter constraint. The size of the sector is
determined by the solution to the constrained optimization problem.
For the case of three ﬁxed points, the set to choose from is given by
[0,τmin] ∪ [τ0;τmax] and the solution again solves the constrained maximiza-
tion problem. These are the values stated in the proposition.
The following ﬁgures illustrate the possibilities. We start with the three
ﬁxed point case (ﬁgure 1). In steady state, the old elite has to choose a point
on the dotted line (τ = τ) where it lies below the (thick) line representing
τt(RC(τ)). This is because otherwise next period’s tax rate is restricted to
be lower than the rate chosen in this period (due to the political power
constraint). Hence, in this example the old elite can choose from the area
between 0 and τmin and τ0 and τmax. The plotted proﬁt curve for the example
r e v e a l st h a tt h eo p t i m a lc h o i c ei si nt h i sc a s et oc h o o s eτ
0.
Now, consider case 1 of ﬁgure 2. In this case, the additional power the
modern sector can gain is restricted and the old elite has a bigger discretion
to choose from. The τ maximizing the old elite’s proﬁts is τold, which is in
this example among the feasible set of tax rates and therefore this point is
chosen. Note, the case with a more powerful old elite allows a larger modern
sector than the more constrained elite of ﬁgure 1. In case 2, the modern
sector is already very strong at the beginning, which restricts the set the old
elite can choose from. This is the case with the largest modern sector and
lowest taxes.
What happens if the old sector is more important, i.e. if y would be
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max  τ ’  τ
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Figure 1: Proﬁts and politically feasible extraction rates8.
higher? This will shift the proﬁtc u r v eu pa n dτold to the right. Given that
the political constraint is not aﬀected, the equilibrium size of the modern
sector will either be unchanged (the same corner solution as before), or it
decreases because of an increase in the equilibrium extraction rate.
These casual observations on the determinants of the size of the modern
sector are now stated more formally.
Proposition 2 A smaller size of the old sector (y) never leads to a smaller
modern sector.
8The present ﬁgure is a plot for the following parameter values: α =0 .6,c =
0.25,PP o =1 ,M =0 .04,y =0 .25
9Case 1 is the same as above only c =0 .4 is larger. Case 2 is the same example as
above but M =0 .5 is larger.
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case 2: ex-ante weak elite 
case 1: weak new politicians 
τ 
Figure 2: Alternative cases: A weak old elite and weak new politicians.9
17Proof. Denote the two economies to be compared by indices A and B.W e
assume yB > yA. The political constraints are unaﬀected by the change in y.
The diﬀerence in equilibrium pay-oﬀ for the old elite between any tax level
in economy A and the same tax level in economy B is then τ(yB −yA). This
m e a n st h a th i g h e rl e v e l so fτ have strictly higher relative pay-oﬀ in B com-
pared to A.I tc a nh e n c en e v e rb et h ec a s et h a tt h ep r e f e r r e do u t c o m ei nA
has a higher τ than in B because otherwise τB would have been a strictly
inferior choice.
This ‘resource fallacy’ arises from the fact that a larger old economy on
the one hand reduces the relative importance of the potential income from
the new sector, and on the other hand increases the costs of a stronger
modern sector because the stronger modern sector may reduce the old sector
extraction rate.
With respect to the importance of the relative initial power of the old
elite, we ﬁnd a non-monotonicity:
Proposition 3 Denote the initial situation as A and the new situation aris-
ing from a marginal increase in M0 as B.
dRC(τ)
dM0 =0iﬀ τA = τold. Other-
wise, in the generic case
dRC(τ)




dM0 < 0 iﬀ
τA = τ0
A. The sign of
dRC(τ)
dPP0 is the opposite of the sign of
dRC(τ)
dM0 .
Proof. The only cases where
dRC(τ)
dM0 6=0is if τA 6= τold. It holds in any case
that dτmin
dM0 < 0 and dτmax
dM0 < 0, whereas dτ0
dM0 > 0. When τA ∈ {τmin
A ,τmax
A },
then in the generic case that point remains optimal (generically, the old elite
strictly prefers one of the two which does not change with a marginal change
in M0) and hence
dRC(τ)
dM0 > 0. Generally hence,
dRC(τ)
dM0 < 0 iﬀ τA = τ0
A. The




dM0 is immediate from the
deﬁnition of ¯ τ.
The interesting case here is when an increase in the exogenous power of
the modern sector actually increases τ. This case emerges when the ex ante
18power of the modern sector was already high enough to force the old elite
into the corner solution τ = τ0. This occurs only if τold <τ 0. Intuitively, the
stronger exogenous power of the modern sector forces the old elite to increase
its extraction rate to prevent the modern sector from driving it down in the
future to very low levels of proﬁt( i . e .w h e nτ = τmin).
There exists a second measure of strength of the old elite and the relative
importance of the old sector. Namely the costs of building the new economy
c (case 1 in ﬁgure 2). This measures the costs of RC. It will aﬀect the proﬁt
curve (τold increases due to the lower productivity of the modern sector)
and the constraints (RC(τ) is lower, hence less power is lost given a certain
extraction rate).
Proposition 4 An increase in c never increases the equilibrium size of the
modern sector in all circumstances.
Proof. An increase in c strictly decreases RC(τ), increases τold and shifts
¯ τ upwards (hence increasing each element in the set {τmin
A ,τmax
A ,τold} but
decreasing τ0). When τA ∈ {τmin
A ,τmax
A ,τold},i ti st h u si m m e d i a t et h a tτ
will increase and RC will thus decrease both directly and indirectly from the
change in c. The only important case is thus τA = τ0
A. To see that RC must
decrease, we need merely note that if it did not, then τB >τ 0
A which would
make the point infeasible.
5 Production and Contacts
In this section we ﬁrst provide some foundation for the assumption that
contacts matter for output and then discuss the speciﬁc assumption we used
above and how they aﬀect the results.
5.1 A simple model of Contacts and Production
Suppose that there are X intermediate goods and X ﬁrms in the modern
sector of the economy. Each ﬁrm i has a comparative advantage in the
19production of the intermediate good i. We take this to mean that ﬁrm i has
an endowment of X intermediate goods of type i and no other intermediate
good. Let pij denote the use of the intermediate good j in the production of








with 0 <γ < 1
Having contacts in this example would literally mean being able to trade




If everyone is connected in this economy, then everyone would specialize
completely in their ﬁeld of comparative advantage and all ﬁrms would exactly
use one unit of each intermediate good. Production in the representative ﬁrm
is than equal to y(X)=X.
Consider now the case where 1 <x<Xﬁrms in this economy are
connected and these x ﬁrms would agree to the social planner allocation
of time and ﬁnal output production. It is optimal that each ﬁrm uses the
same amount of the x intermediate goods produced. The ﬁnal output of the











The resulting function yi(x) is thus a micro-founded production function
of the value of having x contacts arising due to comparative advantages.
This is the same as the production function assumed in section 3, if we add
a constant.
205.2 Generalisation of the Production Function
In the following paragraphs we want to discuss what changes if we assume a
more general production technology in our model as well as discuss the im-
plications of discounting by both the modern and the old elite. Our analysis
was based on a simple and explicitly speciﬁed single input production func-
tion and on the time structure of the model that avoided dynamic aspects
(expectations) of modern sector ﬁrms.
The single input production function is in itself not a serious simpliﬁca-
tion. It represents a reduced form. A standard general equilibrium model in-
corporating labor spend either on physical production, an untaxed constant-
returns-to-scale outside sector, or on generation of contacts, will lead to sim-
ilar insights. It merely speciﬁes the outside option of all agents explicitly in
stead of implicitly (i.e. what ﬁrms would do if they do not invest RC).
What assumptions on f(RC) are needed to derive our results? Whenever
f(RC) is continuous and exhibits decreasing returns to scale, we will see
τ(RC(τ)) increasing in τ. The maximum number of ﬁxed points equals 1
plus twice the number of solutions to
d2τt(RC(τ))
d2τ =0 , which hence depends
on the inverse of the production function. As long as there are at least 3
ﬁxed points, one again will have cases where a more powerful old elite allows
a stronger growth of the modern sector than a weaker elite.
Regarding the dynamics, consider an extension where RC is a stock that
depreciates. Let us assume this rate is given by δ. Thus RCt follows:
RCt =( 1− δ)RCt−1 + Nt.
If we now study the steady state of this problem we ﬁnd that, in any
steady state, it will have to hold that an extra unit of relational capital for





where the left-hand side is the discounted marginal value of an extra
unit of RC and the right-hand side the cost involved. We get an implicit
21decreasing function RC(τ), which brings us in a qualitative sense back to
the main model discussed above. The only substantial diﬀerence is that
the beliefs of the ﬁrms in the modern sector are then important because
they are in many situations self-fulﬁlling. This implies the possibility of
a continuum of equilibria10. To avoid indeterminacy we would then need
a restrictions on beliefs. One candidate that supports the main model is
a focus on non-pessimistic equilibria: If there are two rational expectations
equilibria, ﬁrms will coordinate on the one that gives them no lower expected
pay-oﬀ than the current tax rates. A rationale for this is that ﬁrms after all
are able to coordinate a belief that things will not get worse. If we make
this assumption, then we essentially exclude any path from which one may
get from one equilibrium to another one with a higher τ. This characteristic
i m p l i e sp a t hd e p e n d e n c e( i fo n es t a r t sf r o mτmin, only a massive shock can
get you to τ0 or higher. The reverse may happen by choice). The rest of the
previous analysis however remains as before.11
Now, when the old elite has a higher than zero discount rate, it becomes
possible that they sacriﬁce future proﬁts for current proﬁts and would thus
arrive at a diﬀerent steady state than in the zero-discount scenario. This is
obviously only the case if τold is not a steady state in the zero-discount model,
and indeed only when τmin <τ old <τ 0 (it follows from the convexity of the
per-period proﬁtf u n c t i o no ft h eo l de l i t et h a to n l yi nt h i sc a s ei si tp o s s i b l e
to have a trade-oﬀ between future and current proﬁts). The only diﬀerence
10To give an example: suppose one is, as before, in an equilibrium situation of three
ﬁxed points, where at t=0, τ = τmin and τold >τ 0. If all ﬁrms believe no other will invest,
then they will expect RCt+1 = RCt
1+δ. If that value of RCt+1 coincides with τ>τ 0, ﬁrms will
hence expect tax increases in the future which can rationalise the initial expectation. If on
the other hand ﬁrms expect RCt+1 = RCt, then this too must be a rational expectation.
11This perhaps curious result follows from the fact that nothing constrains extra invest-
ments in RCt at any moment. Hence an old elite will immediately jump to τold if that is in
the choice set because waiting caries no advantage. Otherwise an old elite in equilibrium
will again be stuck at one of the points {τmin
A ,τmax
A ,τ0}. This is because as long as modern
sector ﬁrms minimally believe taxes will not increase, their behaviour will limit the old
elite to the same choice set as in the case without dynamics.
22then arises if in the zero-discount case τ∗ = τ0. T h er e l e v a n tc o n d i t i o nf o r
τ∗ = τ0 to remain as the steady state is if there is no path leading to τmin
with higher discounted proﬁts than the proﬁts made keeping τ∗ = τ0 for all
periods. If there is such a path, then τ0 can no longer be a steady state. This
will be trivially the case with extreme discounting and more generally when
discounting is high.
6 History Revisited and What is Happening
in Uzbekistan?
The diﬀering fortunes of the US and Brazil are particularly instructive for
our model. The secession of the US from the UK was a tax revolt heavily
dependent on networks of bankers and small industry. To a large extent this
revolt was a surprise to the colonial powers, probably alerting elites for the
ﬁrst time to the power of modern networks. Brazil, as described by Gunter
Frank (1967), contained the New World’s ﬁrst iron works, exported textiles
and was then rich in coﬀee, gold, sugar, and diamonds. Its population was
comparable to that of the US. In the 1780’s, Brazil was experiencing a boom
in small-scale industry very reminiscent of the US. With the example of the
US in mind, the colonial ruler of Brazil (i.e. Portugal) decreed:
‘I, the Queen,....., knowing of the large number of factories and manu-
factures which, in recent years, have spread through the various capitanias
of Brazil, ..., I deem it well to order that all the factories, manufactures or
shops of ships...shall be extinguished’ (page 161)
This decree, enforced with the help of the natural resource sector, nipped
the modern Brazilian sector in the bud. By the time the Portuguese royal
court ﬂed Napoleon’s armies in 1808, Brazil no longer had a serious manu-
f a c t u r i n gb a s et oh e l pa n yw a re ﬀort. Without this exogenous shock to the
power of the modern sector at a crucial time, Brazil might well have been
the world’s foremost industrial power today.
In terms of the model and Figure 1, we interpret the successful tax revolt
23a g a i n s tt h eU Ki nt h eU St ob eac a s ew h e r eτ had slipped below τ0 without
the colonial power (the UK) being aware of the actual balance of power.
The political strength apparently inherent in the US at that time had simply
gone unrecognized hitherto. We interpret Brazil in 1786 as a colony where
the colonial power feared a similar event and hence set τ equal to τmax.
The history of industrialization as well as the diﬀerent developments of
transition economies provide a wealth of further experiences. We ﬁrst want
to discuss shortly the European experience with industrialization. Similar to
Acemoglu and Robinson (2000), we concentrate on the case of Britain and
Germany vs. Austria and the Russian Empire.
As Acemoglu and Robinson (2000) argue, Britain and Germany initially
had more democratic institutions compared to Austria and Russia. This im-
plied that members of the modern sector had already in the beginning a larger
say in the politics of those countries. This concurs with our model where a
large power (M0) of the modern sector at the beginning of the development
period helps to develop a larger modern economy. To these observations, we
add that Austria and Russia had relatively large old sectors; the civic society
of both countries was less developed and more centralized than in Britain
and Germany. Hence, the old elites had more to lose and the modern sec-
tor faced higher costs of building up a network. Furthermore, the political
developments in other European countries might have warned the elites in
Austria and Russia that a growing modern sector would demand political
rights and hence decrease the rents to the old elite.
A modern source of relevant experiences is the comparison between tran-
sition economies that are resource poor compared with ‘natural resource’
economies.
Table one provides some (limited) evidence. It lists the countries in the
former USSR, gives information about their growth experience in the 1995-
2000 period, the composition of their economy, and the degree of press free-
dom in this period. We interpret the percentage of the economy working in
the service sector as a proxy for the current size of the modern sector. The
24countries of the former USSR are constitutionally all democracies but politi-
cal freedom is often restricted by political control of the media. We interpret
press freedom as an indicator of the political power of new politicians.
We can use this data to look at two hypothesis from the model. The
ﬁrst is the simple prediction that the bigger the size of the modern sector,
the less political power the old elite has. This relation is depicted in Figure
3, where we have overlaid the prediction of a simple regression model. The
highly signiﬁcant negative slope (signiﬁcant at the 1% level) reveals that the
data cannot reject the hypothesis that a greater size of the service sector the
lower the restraints on press freedom (and vice versa).
The second hypothesis we raise is that both very weak old elites and ex-
tremely strong old elites have less constraints on the growth of the modern
sector. We empirically implement this by looking at whether we ﬁnd a u-
shaped relation between the political power of the old elite and the economic
growth rate. This relation is depicted in Figure 4 which indeed ﬁnds a sig-
niﬁcant u-shaped relation between press freedom and economic growth. In
the regression analysis underlying this, both the linear press freedom term
and the quadratic press freedom term are signiﬁcant at the 1% level. Fur-
thermore, of those countries with high growth rates but low press freedom
only one (Belarus) has an export economy mainly based on other things than
natural resources industries.
25Table 1 : Evidence from former USSR countries
Agr./Ind./Serv.
Country GDP comp % Industries ∆GDP Press
(Lab. force %) (% of export) ’95-00 Freed.
Armenina 30/26/44 diamonds, minerals, 0,248 59 PF-
(45/25/30) food
Azerbaijan 20/33/47 oil and gas (90) 0,615 76 NF
(41/7/52)
Belarus 15/40/45 machinery, minerals 0,487 80 NF
(n.a.)
Estonia 5.8/28.6/65.6 machin.(33),wood(15), 0,397 20 F-
(11/20/69) textiles(14), food (8)
Georgia 20/25/55 machinery, chemicals 0,091 53 PF-
(40/20/40) (’96-00)
Kazakhstan 9/40/51 oil (58), metals (24) 0,352 70 NF
(20/30/50)
Kyrgyzstan 35/25/40 cott.,wool,gold, 0,048 61 NF
(55/15/30) uranium
Latvia 4.5/26/69.5 wood, machinery, 0,268 24 F-
(15/25/60) metals
Lithuania 8/31/61 miner.(23),text.(16), 0,272 20 F-
(20/30/50) machin.(11),chem.(6)
Moldova 28/23/49 food, textiles, -0,134 59 PF-
(40/14/46) machinery
Russia 5.8/34.6/59.6 oil/gas,wood,metal, 0,291 60 PF-
(12.3/22.7/65) chemicals
Tajikistan 19/26/55 aluminium,electricity, 0,306 79 NF
(67.2/7.5/25.3) cotton, food (’96-00)
Turkmenistan 27/50/23 gas/oil(83), n.a. 89 NF
(48/15/37) cotton/textiles(5)
Ukraine 23/42/35 metals,fuel,chemicals, -0,005 60 PF-
(24/32/44) machinery
Uzbekistan 36/21/43 cott.(41.5), gold(9.6), 0,159 84 NF
(44/20/36) energy (9.6) (’94-66)
Sources CIA Factb.(2003) CIA Factbook (2003) PTab12 PFS13
12GDP growth rates are taken from the Penn World Table: http://pwt.econ.upenn.edu/.
13Press Freedom Survey (Sussman and Deutsch Karlekar, 2002): 0-30 indicates a free,
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Figure 4: Press freedom and economic growth in the former USSR countries
27W i t ht h i sd a t ai nm i n d ,w ec a nn o wp o s et h eq u e s t i o nw h yi ti sn o tt h e
case that countries rich in natural resources use these resources to speed up
the growth of a modern sector? Especially pertinent are the cases of the
Arab Oil exporting countries like Oman, Saudi Arabia, and Kuwait. Our
argument here is not only that there was little resource rent to ﬁght over in
the resource-poor transition countries compared to the middle east, but also
that the old elite faced more initial political competition from an already
partially developed new sector.
The richness of Asian CIS countries (incl. Uzbekistan) in natural re-
sources could lead the old elite to actively discourage the growth of a mod-
ern sector. Furthermore, the lack of a civic society does not only erode the
power of a modern sector at the beginning of the development, but it may
also increase the costs of building networks (see Frijters, Bezemer, and Dul-
leck (2003) for an elaborate model of social capital, civic society and the
costs of building networks). This leaves more power to the old elite and re-
duces the potential of the modern sector. This latter explanation may also
explain why the countries joining the EU in 2004 are more advanced in their
development than for example Bulgaria and Romania.
Preventing a modern sector from growing can take many guises. Limits
on education are a case in point. Not only did the old elites of the former
USSR countries distributed the pie among them given their former formal
power, but the long period of Socialism laid the basis of real authority in the
sense of Aghion and Tirole (1997), namely education and knowledge were
eroded and had been only accessible to members of the system. Restricted
use of public services is of course an implicit form of taxation on others. Such
restrictions in much of the former USSR lead to the absence of oppositions
like the opposition present in Poland and Czechoslovakia that was able to
push the old elite aside.
287 Conclusions
We presented a model to show that a powerful old elite may implement
policies that provide disincentives for modern sector to grow, if this modern
sector aﬀects the old elites ability to extract rents from the economy. The
m a i na r g u m e n ti st h a tam o d e r ns e c t o rg o e sh a n di nh a n dw i t hn e wn e t w o r k s
that are not only production enhancing, but also aﬀect politics.
We believe that this model adds to the understanding of historic de-
velopments. Firstly, we attempted to shift the focus from elite’s supposed
aversion to technology to an aversion against network formation. Secondly,
we attempted to argue that instead of viewing changes in a system as dis-
crete policy changes - either in the form of discrete reforms or in the form
of revolutions, we should realize that elites always retain some power, which
gives them an interest in larger future economies.
In our historical analysis, we interpreted the US as being ‘lucky’, i.e. as
having been the ﬁrst colony to experience the power of modern networks
before its colonial ruler got wise to that power. We argue that Brazil, which
in some sense had a large resource advantage compared to the US (and even
some technological ‘ﬁrsts’) was unlucky. Its colonial ruler, the Queen of
Portugal, in 1786 deliberately dismantled the growing manufacturing base
of Brazil in favor of resource extraction and thereby prevented a US-type
development path.
Besides its usefulness in the understanding of industrialization, the model
also helps to understand the experiences of transition economies. All of the
transition countries formally adopted a democracy, which meant the old elite
had to defend its position by playing the democratic game. Nonetheless,
those societies where the political base of a new sector was weak whilst
natural resources were abundant saw reversed reforms after the break-up of
the USSR. We also argue that regimes which are very highly entrenched in
t h es e n s eo fl a r g e‘ ﬁxed’ political power have less to fear and may reform
more than weaker regimes. This might explain why in growth regressions
dictatorial regimes fare better in poor countries than democratic regimes.
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